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Summary
This paper examines critically some recent developments in the sustainability debate. The large
number of definitions of sustainability proposed in the 1980's have been refined into a smaller
number of positions on the relevant questions in the 1990's. The most prominent of these are
based on the idea of maintaining a capital stock. I call this the capital theory approach (CTA).
Though these concepts are beginning to inform policies there are a number of difficulties in
applying this approach in a theoretically valid manner and a number of critics of the use of the CTA
as a guide to policy. First, I examine the internal difficulties with the CTA and continue to review
criticisms from outside the neoclassical normative framework. The accounting approach obscures
the underlying assumptions used and gives undue authoritativeness to the results. No account is
taken of the uncertainty involved in sustainability analysis of any sort. In addition, by focusing on
a representative consumer and using market (or contingent market) valuations of environmental
resources, the approach (in common with most normative neoclassical economics) does not take
into account distributional issues or accommodate alternative views on environmental values.
Finally, I examine alternative approaches to sustainability analysis and policy making. These
approaches accept the open-ended and multi-dimensional nature of sustainability and explicitly
open up to political debate the questions that are at risk of being hidden inside the black-box of
seemingly objective accounting.
2I . INTRODUCTION
The Brundtland Report (WCED, 1987) proposed that sustainable development is "development
that meets the needs of the present generation while letting future generations meet their own
needs". Economists initially had some difficulty with this concept, some dismissing it1 and others
proliferating a vast number of alternative definitions and policy prescriptions (see surveys by:
Pezzey, 1989; Pearce et al., 1989; Rees, 1990; Lélé, 1991).
In recent years, economists have made some progress in articulating their conception of
sustainability. The large number of definitions of sustainability proposed in the 1980's have been
refined into a smaller number of positions on the relevant questions in the 1990's. There is
agreement that sustainability implies that certain indicators of welfare or development are non-
declining over the very long term, that is development is sustained (Pezzey, 1989). Sustainable
development is a process of change in an economy that does not violate such a sustainability
criterion. Beyond this, the dominant views are based on the idea of maintaining a capital stock as a
prerequisite for sustainable development. Within this school of thought there are opposing camps
which disagree on the empirical question of the degree to which various capital stocks can be
substituted for each other, though there has been little actual empirical research on this question.
There is a consensus among a large number of economists that the CTA is a useful means of
addressing sustainability issues.2 Capital theory concepts are beginning to inform policy, as in the
case of the UN recommendations on environmental accounting and the US response to them
(Beardsley, 1994; Carson et al., 1994; Steer and Lutz, 1993). There are, however, a growing
number of critics who question whether this is a useful way to address sustainability (eg.
Norgaard, 1991; Amir, 1992; Common and Perrings, 1992; Karshenas, 1994; Pezzey, 1994;
Common and Norton, 1994; Faucheux et al., 1994; Common, 1995). The literature on sustainable
development and sustainability is vast and continually expanding. There are also a large number of
3surveys of that literature (eg. Tisdell, 1988; Pearce et al., 1989; Rees, 1990; Simonis, 1990; Lélé,
1991; Costanza and Daly, 1992; Pezzey, 1992; Toman et al., 1994). I do not intend to survey this
literature.
The aim of this paper is to present a critique of the capital theory approach to sustainability (CTA
henceforth) as a basis for policy. This critique both outlines the difficulties in using and applying
the CTA from a viewpoint internal to neoclassical economics and problems with this approach
from a viewpoint external to neoclassical economics. I also suggest some alternative approaches to
sustainability relevant analysis and policy. The neoclasscial sustainability literature generally
ignores the international dimensions of the sustainability problem. I also ignore this dimension in
this paper.
The paper is structured as follows. In the second section, I discuss the background to the
emergence of the capital theory approach, while the third section briefly outlines the basic features
of the approach. The fourth section examines the limitations of the CTA from within the viewpoint
of neoclassical economics and the debate between proponents of "weak sustainability" and "strong
sustainability". The following sections examine the drawbacks of this paradigm from a viewpoint
external to neoclassical economics and discuss alternative methods of analysis and decision-making
for sustainability. The concluding section summarizes the principal points.
II. THE SHIFTING DEBATE: EMERGENCE OF THE CAPITAL THEORY
APPROACH
Much of the literature on sustainable development published in the 1980's was vague (see Lélé,
1991; Rees, 1990; Simonis, 1990). There was a general lack of precision and agreement in
defining sustainability, and outlining appropriate sustainability policies. This confusion stemmed in
part from an imprecise demarcation between ends and means. By "ends" I mean the definition of
4sustainability ie. what is to be sustained, while "means" are the methods to achieve sustainability or
necessary and/or sufficient conditions that must be met in order to do the same. As the goal of
policy must be a subjective choice, considerable debate surrounded and continues to surround the
definition of sustainability (eg. Tisdell, 1988). As there is considerable scientific uncertainty
regarding sustainability possibilities, considerable debate continues to surround policies to achieve
any given goal.
Sharachchandra Lélé (1991) stated that "sustainable development is in real danger of becoming a
cliché like appropriate technology - a fashionable phrase that everyone pays homage to but nobody
cares to define" (607). Lélé pointed out that different authors and speakers meant very different
things by sustainability, and that even UNEP's and WCED's definitions of sustainable
development were vague, and confused ends with means. Neither provided any scientific
examination of whether their proposed policies would lead to increased sustainability. "Where the
sustainable development movement has faltered is in its inability to develop a set of concepts,
criteria and policies that are coherent or consistent - both externally (with physical and social
reality) and internally (with each other)." (613). Judith Rees (1990) expressed extreme skepticism
concerning both sustainable development and its proponents. “It is easy to see why the notion of
sustainable development has become so popular ... No longer does environmental protection mean
sacrifice and confrontation with dominant materialist values” (435). She also argued that
sustainable development was just so much political rhetoric. A UNEP report stated: "The ratio of
words to action is weighted too heavily towards the former" (quoted in Simonis, 1990, 35). In the
early days of the sustainability debate, vagueness about the meaning of sustainability was
advantageous in attracting the largest constituency possible, but in the longer run, greater clarity is
essential for sustaining concern.
In the 1990's many people have put forward much more precisely articulated definitions of
sustainable development, conditions and policies required to achieve sustainability, and criteria to
5assess whether development is sustainable. This has coincided with a shift from a largely
politically-driven dialogue to a more theory-driven dialogue. With this has come a clearer
understanding of what kinds of policies would be required to move towards alternative
sustainability goals, and what the limits of our knowledge are. There is a stronger awareness of the
distinction between ends and means. Most, but not all (eg. Amir, 1992), analysts agree that
sustainable development is a meaningful concept but that the claims of the Brundtland Report
(WCED, 1987) that growth just had to change direction were far too simplistic.
There is a general consensus, especially among economists, on the principal definition of
sustainable development used by David Pearce et al. (1989, 1991): Non-declining average human
welfare over time (Mäler, 1991; Pezzey, 1992; Toman et al., 1994).3 This definition of
sustainability implies a departure from the strict principle of maximizing net present value in
traditional cost benefit analysis (Pezzey, 1989), but otherwise it does not imply a large departure
from conventional economics. John Pezzey (1989, 1994) suggests a rule of maximizing net
present value subject to the sustainability constraint of non-declining mean welfare. It encompasses
many but not all definitions of sustainability. For example, it excludes a definition of sustainability
based on maintaining a set of ecosystem functions, which seems to be implied by the Holling-
sustainability criterion (Common and Perrings, 1992; Holling, 1973, 1986) or on maintaining
given stocks of natural assets irrespective of any contribution to human welfare. A sustainable
ecosystem might not be an undesirable goal but it could be too strict a criterion for the goal of
maintaining human welfare (Karshenas, 1994) and could in some circumstances lead to declining
human welfare. Not all ecosystem functions and certainly not all natural assets may be necessary
for human welfare. Some aspects of the natural world such as smallpox bacteria may be absolutely
detrimental to people. In the context of the primary Pearce et al. definition, the Holling-
sustainability criterion is a means not an end.
6The advantage of formalizing the concept of sustainability is that this renders it amenable to
analysis by economic theory (eg. Barbier and Markandya, 1991; Victor, 1991; Common and
Perrings, 1992; Pezzey, 1989, 1994; Asheim, 1994) and to quantitative investigations (eg. Repetto
et al., 1989; Pearce and Atkinson, 1993; Proops and Atkinson, 1993; Stern, 1995). Given the
above formal definition of sustainability, many economists have examined what the necessary or
sufficient conditions for the achievement of sustainability might be. Out of this activity has come
the CTA described in the next section. The great attractiveness of this new approach is that it
suggests relatively simple rules to ensure sustainability and relatively simple indicators of
sustainability. This situation has seemingly cleared away the vagueness that previously attended
discussions of sustainability and prompted relatively fast action by governments and international
organizations to embrace specific goals and programs aimed at achieving this notion of the
necessary conditions for sustainability.
III. THE ESSENCE OF THE CAPITAL THEORY APPROACH
The origins of the CTA are in the literature on economic growth and exhaustible resources that
flourished in the 1970s, exemplified by the special issue of the Review of Economic Studies
published in 1974 (Heal, 1974). Robert Solow (1986) built on this earlier literature and the work
of John Hartwick (1977, 1978a, 1978b) to formalize the constant capital rule. In these early
models there was a single non-renewable resource and a stock of manufactured capital goods. A
production function produced a single output, which could be used for either consumption or
investment using the two inputs. The elasticity of substitution between the two inputs was one
which implied that natural resources were essential but that the average product of resources could
rise without bound given sufficient manufactured capital.
The models relate to the notion of sustainability as non-declining welfare through the assumption
that welfare is a monotonically increasing function of consumption (eg. Mäler, 1991). The path of
7consumption over time (and therefore of the capital stock) in these model economies depends on
the intertemporal optimization rule. Under the Rawlsian maxi-min condition consumption must be
constant. No net saving is permissible as this is regarded as an unjust burden on the present
generation. Under the Ramsey utilitarian approach with zero discounting consumption can increase
without bound (Solow, 1974). Here the present generation may be forced to accept a subsistence
standard of living if this can benefit the future generations however richer they might be. Paths that
maximize net present value with positive discount rates typically peak and then decline so that they
are not sustainable (Pezzey, 1994). Pezzey (1989) suggested a hybrid version which maximizes
net present value subject to an intertemporal constraint that utility be non-declining. In this case
utility will first increase until it reaches a maximum sustainable level. This has attracted consensus
as the general optimizing criterion for sustainable development. Geir Asheim (1991) derives this
condition more formally.
Under the assumption that the elasticity of substitution is one, non-declining consumption depends
on the maintenance of the aggregate capital stock ie. conventional capital plus natural resources,
used to produce consumption (and investment) goods (Solow, 1986). Aggregate capital, Wt, and
the change in aggregate capital are defined by:
Wt = pKtKt  +  pRtSt (1)
∆Wt = pKt∆Kt  +  pRtRt (2)
where S is the stock of non-renewable resources and R the use per period. K is the manufactured
capital stock and the pi are the relevant prices. In the absence of depreciation of manufactured
capital, maintenance of the capital stock implies investment of the rents from the depletion of the
natural resource in manufactured capital - the Hartwick rule (Hartwick 1977, 1978a, 1978b).
Income is defined using the Hicksian notion (Hicks, 1946) that income is the maximum
consumption in a period consistent with the maintenance of wealth. Sustainable income is,
8therefore, the maximum consumption in a period consistent with the maintenance of aggregate
capital intact (Weitzman, 1976; Mäler, 1991) and for a flow of income to be sustainable, the stock
of capital needs to be constant or increasing over time (Solow, 1986).
The initial work can be extended in various ways. The definition of capital that satisfies these
conditions can be extended to include a number of categories of "capital": natural, manufactured,
human, and institutional.4 Natural capital is a term used by many authors (it seems Smith (1977)
was the first) for the aggregate of natural resource stocks that produce inputs of services or
commodities for the economy. Some of the components of natural capital may be renewable
resources. Manufactured capital refers to the standard neoclassical definition of "a factor of
production produced by the economic system" (Pearce, 1992). Human capital also follows the
standard definition. Institutional capital includes the institutions and knowledge necessary for the
organization and reproduction of the economic system. It includes the ethical or moral capital
referred to by Fred Hirsch (1976) and the cultural capital referred to by Fikret Berkes and Carl
Folke (1992). For convenience I give the name 'artificial capital' to the latter three categories
jointly. None of these concepts is unproblematic and natural capital is perhaps the most
problematic. Technical change and population growth can also be accommodated (see Solow,
1986).
Empirical implementation of the CTA tends to focus on measurement of sustainable income (eg. El
Serafy, 1989; Repetto, 1989) or net capital accumulation (eg. Pearce and Atkinson, 1993; Proops
and Atkinson, 1993) rather than on direct estimation of the capital stock.5 The theoretical models
that underpin the CTA typically assume a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns
to scale, no population growth, and no technological change. Any indices of net capital
accumulation which attempt to make even a first approximation to reality must take these variables
into account. None of the recent empirical studies does so. For example, David Pearce and Giles
Atkinson (1993) present data from eighteen countries on savings and depreciation of natural and
9manufactured capital as a proportion of GNP. They demonstrate that only eight countries had non-
declining stocks of total capital, measured at market prices, and thus passed a weak sustainability
criterion of a constant aggregate capital stock, but their methodology ignores population growth,
returns to scale or technological change.
IV. INTERNAL APPRAISAL OF THE CAPITAL THEORY APPROACH
In this section, I take as given the basic assumptions and rationale of neoclassical economics and
highlight some of the technical problems that are encountered in using the CTA as an operational
guide to policy. From a neoclassical standpoint these might be seen as difficulties in the positive
theory that may lead to difficulties in the normative theory of sustainability policy. In the following
section, I take as given solutions to these technical difficulties and examine some of the problems
inherent in the normative neoclassical approach to sustainability.
a . Limits to Substitution in Production and "Strong Sustainability"
Capital theorists are divided among proponents of weak sustainability and strong sustainability.
This terminology is confusing as it suggests that the various writers have differing ideas of what
sustainability is.6 In fact they agree on that issue, but differ on what is the minimum set of
necessary conditions for achieving sustainability. The criterion that distinguishes the categories is
the degree of substitutability believed to be possible between natural and artificial capital.7
The weak sustainability viewpoint follows from the early literature and holds that the relevant
capital stock is an aggregate stock of artificial and natural capital. Weak sustainability assumes that
the elasticity of substitution between natural capital and artificial capital is one and therefore that
there are no natural resources that contribute to human welfare that cannot be asymptotically
replaced by other forms of capital. Reductions in natural capital may be offset by increases in
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artificial capital. It is sometimes implied that this might be not only a necessary condition but also a
sufficient condition for achieving sustainability (eg. Solow, 1986, 1993).
Proponents of the strong sustainability viewpoint such as Robert Costanza and Herman Daly
(1992) argue that though this is a necessary condition for sustainability it cannot possibly be a
sufficient condition. Instead, a minimum necessary condition is that separate stocks of aggregate
natural capital and aggregate artificial capital must be maintained. Costanza and Daly (1992) state:
"It is important for operational purposes to define sustainable development in terms of constant or
nondeclining total natural capital, rather than in terms of nondeclining utility" (39).8 Other analysts
such as members of the "London School" hold views between these two extremes (see Victor,
1991). They argue that though it is possible to substitute between natural and artificial capital there
are certain stocks of "critical natural capital" for which no substitutes exist. A necessary condition
for sustainability is that these individual stocks must be maintained in addition to the general
aggregate capital stock.
The weak sustainability condition violates the Second Law of Thermodynamics, as a minimum
quantity of energy is required to transform matter into economically useful products (Hall et al.,
1986) and energy cannot be produced inside the economic system.9 It also violates the First Law
on the grounds of mass balance (Pezzey, 1994). Also ecological principles concerning the
importance of diversity in system resilience (Common and Perrings, 1992) imply that minimum
quantities of  a large number of different capital stocks (eg. species) are required to maintain life
support services. The London School view and strong sustainability accommodate these facts by
assuming that there are lower bounds on the stocks of natural capital required to support the
economy, in terms of the supply of materials and energy, and in terms of the assimilative capacity
of the environment, and that certain categories of critical natural capital cannot be replaced by other
forms of capital.
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Beyond this recognition it is an empirical question as to how far artificial capital can substitute for
natural capital. There has been little work on this at scales relevant to sustainability. However, the
econometric evidence from studies of manufacturing industry suggest on the whole that energy and
capital are complements (Berndt and Wood, 1979).
In some ways the concept of maintaining a constant stock of aggregate natural capital is even more
bizarre than maintaining a non-declining stock of total capital. It seems more reasonable to suggest
that artificial capital might replace some of the functions of natural capital than to suggest that in
general various natural resources may be substitutes for each other. How can oil reserves substitute
for clean air, or iron deposits for topsoil? Recognizing this, some of the strong sustainability
proponents have dropped the idea of maintaining an aggregate natural capital stock as proposed by
Costanza and Daly (1992) and instead argue that minimum stocks of all natural resources should be
maintained (Faucheux and O'Connor, 1995). However, this can no longer really be considered an
example of the CTA. Instead it is an approach that depends on the concept of safe minimum
standards or the precautionary principle. The essence of the CTA is that some aggregation of
resources using monetary valuations is proposed as an indicator for sustainability.
The types of models which admit an index of aggregate capital, whether aggregate natural capital or
aggregate total capital, is very limited. Construction of aggregate indices or subindices of inputs
depend on the production function being weakly separable in those subgroups (Berndt and
Christensen, 1973). For example it is only possible to construct an index of aggregate natural
capital if the marginal rate of substitution between two forms of natural capital is independent of the
quantities of labor or capital employed. This seems an unlikely proposition as the exploitation of
many natural resources is impractical without large capital stocks. For example, in the production
of caught fish, the marginal rate of substitution, and under perfect competition the price ratio,
between stocks of fresh water fish and marine fish should be independent of the number of fishing
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boats available. This is clearly not the case. People are not likely to put a high value on the stock of
deep sea fish when they do not have boats to catch them with.
If substitution is limited, technological progress might reduce the quantity of natural resource
inputs required per unit of output. However, there are arguments that indicate that technical
progress itself is bounded (see Pezzey, 1994; Stern, 1994). One of these (Pezzey, 1994) is that,
just as in the case of substitution, ultimately the laws of thermodynamics limit the minimization of
resource inputs per unit output. Stern (1994) argues that unknown useful knowledge is itself a
nonrenewable resource. Technological progress is the extraction of this knowledge from the
environment and the investment of resources in this activity will eventually be subject to
diminishing returns.
Limits to substitution in production might be thought of in a much broader way to include
nonlinearities and threshold effects. This view is sometimes described as the "ecological"
viewpoint on sustainability (Common and Perrings, 1992; Common, 1995) or as the importance of
maintaining the "resilience" of ecological systems rather than any specific stocks or species. This
approach derives largely from the work of Holling (1973, 1986). In this view ecosystems are
locally stable in the presence of small shocks or perturbations but may be irreversibly altered by
large shocks. Structural changes in ecosystems such as those that come about through human
interference and particularly simplification, may make these systems more susceptible to losing
resilience and being permanently degraded. There is clearly some substitutability between species
or inorganic elements in the role of maintaining ecosystem productivity, however, beyond a certain
point this substitutability may suddenly fail to hold true. This approach also asks us to look at
development paths as much less linear and predictable than is implied in the CTA literature.
All things considered, what emerges is a quite different approach to sustainability policy. It is
probable that substitution between natural and artificial capital is limited, as is ultimately technical
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change. Additionally the joint economy-ecosystem system may be subject to nonlinear dynamics.
This implies that eventually the economy must approach a steady state where the volume of
physical economic activity is dependent on the maximum economic and sustainable yield of
renewable resources or face decline ie. profit (or utility) maximizing use of renewable resources
subject to the sustainability constraint. As in Herman Daly's vision (Daly, 1977) qualitative change
in the nature of economic output is still possible. Sustainability policy would require not just
maintaining some stocks of renewable resources but also working to reduce "threats to
sustainability" (Common, 1995) that might cause the system to pass over a threshold and reduce
long-run productivity.
The notion of Hicksian income originally applied to an individual price-taking firm (Faucheux and
O'Connor, 1995). However, even here it is not apparent that the myopic policy of maintaining
capital intact from year to year is the best or only way to ensure the sustainability of profits into the
future. If a competing firm makes an innovation that renders the firm's capital stock obsolete, the
latter's income may drop to zero. This is despite it previously following a policy of maintaining its
capital intact. The firm's income measured up to this point is clearly seen to be unsustainable. In
fact its policy has been shown to be irrelevant to long-run sustainability. In the real world firms
will carry out activities that may not contribute to the year to year maintenance of capital and will
reduce short-run profits such as research and development and attempts to gain market share.10
These activities make the firm more resilient against future shocks and hence enhance
sustainability.
b . Prices for Aggregation
Supposing that the necessary separability conditions are met so that aggregation of a capital stock is
possible, analysts still have to obtain an appropriate set of prices so that the value of the capital
stock is a sustainability relevant value. The CTA is more or less tautological if we use the "right"
prices. However, these correct "sustainability prices" are unknown and unknowable. A number of
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related arguments have been made.11  It seems to me that the most general argument is made by
Pezzey (1994).
Pezzey's detailed argument is presented in the context of the Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Solow
(1974) models of a closed economy with capital accumulation and non-renewable resource
depletion with no technical progress, but many of the propositions have more general validity.
Though his wording is somewhat enigmatic, Solow (1986) appeared (and has been widely
understood) to claim that in such models non-declining aggregate wealth measured at competitive
market prices along an efficient path (ie net present value maximizing) guarantees sustainability.
This turns out to be incorrect.  As the 1974 literature showed, only at zero discount rates is an
efficient path a sustainable path in the type of economy mentioned: at positive discount rates an
NPV maximizing consumption path will peak and then decline monotnically.12 Pezzey shows that
there will then be a finite time period during which the economy is unsustainable (i.e. the current
level of consumption cannot be maintained indefinitely) but aggregate wealth is rising.  Hence the
maximum level of consumption that can be maintained indefinitely may be less than current
consumption despite non-declining aggregate wealth.  Furthermore, adopting a policy during the
above finite time period that maintains the aggregate capital stock does not guarantee sustainability,
because consumption must drop at the instant that the policy is adopted.  Intuitively, the
sustainability relevant shadow price of the resource exceeds its market rent. Related results have
been derived by Asheim (1994).  Pearce (1994), a major proponent of the CTA, concedes that this
point may have implications for 'green'accounting.
The further we depart from simple neoclassical growth models the more distant is the prospect of
finding the "true" sustainability prices. It becomes impossible when we consider non-linearities
such as discontinuous changes in environmental parameters as critical thresholds are passed and
irreversibilities such as species extinctions. There is an inherent danger in using rigid rules in a
nonlinear and evolving economy-environment system. Richard Norgaard (1994) and Charles
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Perrings (1987) have both examined this question and argue that institutions such as fixed property
rights in nature are likely to exacerbate environmental problems rather than reduce them. Perrings
(1987) argues against placing prices on in situ  environmental resources under any circumstances,
stating "Few other ideas in economic theory can be so obviously misplaced" (94).
Many environmentalists, and some environmental economists argue that any positive prices for
natural resources are better than zero prices. Michael Common (1995) argues that unless the new
prices are the "true" sustainability prices, the shift in relative prices between different resources
after positive prices are imposed may lead to the overexploitation of resources which are now
relatively cheaper than in the previous state. This is especially important if the price ratio shifts
against resources that are relatively more crucial for sustainability. Non-market pricing
methodologies, such as contingent valuation, are likely to lead to higher prices for more
aesthetically attractive resources or species. These resources may not be the most crucial for life
support. In this case development pressure will be deflected to the more critical resource.13
c . Limits to Substitution in Consumption
Limited substitution possibilities in consumption may also make it impossible to derive meaningful
capital aggregates which are monotonically related to welfare. I examine two significant sources of
this phenomenon: basic subsistence needs and the direct role of environmental assets in welfare or
people's belief systems.
Certain goods representing basic needs must be consumed eg. food, shelter etc. It is apparent that
at least minimal natural resource inputs are necessary to produce these goods and services. The
case of food is clear - people must be able to capture energy from the environment in a form
suitable for metabolism. Also minimal material and energy inputs will be required to buffer or
separate people from the vagaries of the external environment. Therefore, at least in producing
these products the average product of resources is bounded, and as these goods must appear in
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total output the ratio of total output to resource input must be bounded. This argument has been
made most strongly by Daly (1977). However, it is still claimed that what is valued may be purely
the product of human psychology (eg. Pezzey, 1994) and that therefore there is no way to know if
the ratio of the value  of output to resource input is limited.
Preserved natural environments are a source of direct utility. The utility derived from these stocks
of resources may result from use value eg. visits to a national park; option value - utility people
experience from knowledge that they could visit the area in question; or through existence value -
utility people experience due to their knowledge that a particular part of the natural environment has
been preserved, even if they do not plan to visit it. With limited exceptions (eg. Vousden, 1972;
Krautkraemer, 1985) the literature on resource depletion and sustainability has paid little attention
to the direct value people might attribute to natural resources apart from their use in production. On
the other hand a large literature in environmental economics has attempted to estimate "existence
values" and other non-consumptive use values for environmental assets. However, both the
methodology used to assess these prices and their use in national accounts, depend on
substitutability assumptions (Common et al. 1994, Spash and Hanley, 1995). Limits to
substitution between manufactured goods and services, produced by both artificial and natural
capital, and natural capital in consumption or household production may stem from both utilitarian
and non-utilitarian reasons. John Krutilla (1967) initially raised the possibility of limited
substitutability for utilitarian reasons in a static context. First I examine the utilitarian approach and
then the non-utilitarian approach.
Assume the standard Dasgupta-Heal economy described above with the addition that the resource
stock also enters the utility function. This is the model considered by Vousden (1973). This would
be reasonable if for example resource extraction means converting an environment into a less
desirable form as for example in opencast quarrying. Then unless natural resources and produced
goods and services are close substitutes in consumption, substitution of artificial capital for natural
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resources cannot indefinitely guarantee the maintenance of non-declining utility. At some point the
added utility from produced commodities and services will be smaller than the lost utility from
converted environments. For example, assume that the utility function is a CES function and that
the elasticity of substitution in consumption between resources and consumption goods is less than
one. Given that the resource is non-renewable and essential even a constant level of welfare will
not be possible and utility must eventually decline.
From a non-utilitarian perspective, intrinsic value in nature may also limit consumption substitution
possibilities. Intrinsic value may either be expressed as a right of a species or individuals of a
species etc. to exist or not be harmed, or as a limit on human rights of action with respect to nature.
The former might be characterized as a rights-based belief system (Spash and Hanley, 1995) which
extends the humanist ethic to other species and/or inanimate nature. The latter is more characteristic
of a religious ethic that does not assign rights to other organisms but does not believe humans have
any intrinsic right to alter nature.14 Intrinsic value may be expressed within utilitarian preferences
as existence value. When such beliefs are more strongly held they will be expressed as a limit to
substitution in the form of lexicographic preferences. In the model proposed by Steven Edwards
(1986, 1992) and Thomas Stevens et al. (1991) utilitarian preferences may be held for ordinary
consumption goods and services but a minimum level of wildlife will not be traded off against
other goods. Both Stevens et al. (1991) and Clive Spash and Nick Hanley (1995) provide
empirical evidence of the existence of such lexicographic preferences for wildlife. Dan Vadnjal and
Martin O'Connor (1994) suggest the same in regard to unique landscapes.
V. EXTERNAL APPRAISAL OF THE CAPITAL THEORY APPROACH
Any conditions or indicators for sustainability derived from the CTA are only true indicators that
society is developing sustainably under limited and unlikely conditions which are specific to the
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particular model of the economy that is implicitly or explicitly assumed. Mick Common (1993)
expresses this view:
"There is no prospect of a unique measure of PNDP [proper net domestic product].
What this approach would measure is PNDP for a model, not PNDP for an actual
economy. And, the nature of adjustments to conventionally assessed NDP ...
would also be model dependent ... [Sustainability] is not a problem that can be
reduced to the dimensions of a single number indicator." (8-11)
CTA analysis or "green accounting" is as dependent on a specific underlying model of the
economy as macroeconomic forecasting. Nevertheless, measures of sustainable income or net
capital accumulation are given more credibility than is given to macroeconomic forecasts over a
very short time horizon of a couple of years or so. The accuracy of sustainable income figures is
comparable to macroeconomic forecasts over a hundred year or greater time horizon. The opaque
nature of the aggregated indices of sustainable income or aggregate capital that result from capital
theory analysis often hides the restrictive assumptions underlying these models. The
macroeconomic models used in forecasting are usually less restrictive in nature and the
assumptions are clearly laid out in the form of the model equations. Many of the assumptions
underlying capital theory analysis are usually implicit rather than openly expressed. Despite the
more complex nature of macroeconomic models they have frequently been criticized for "incredible
restrictions" (Sims, 1980) and the forecasting performance of many models over even short time
horizons is notorious. It seems probable that if we simulated the actual models behind CTA
analyses the results would be even worse than for conventional macroeconomic models.
Public economic debate focuses on a large number of variables that reflect different interests: GNP,
unemployment, interest rates, house prices, inflation, income distribution, progressivity of taxation
etc. The political process decides what weight is given to each of these factors in economic policy.
However, in the last decade or two politicians have increasingly delegated decision-making to
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economic technocrats and espoused conservative economic rhetoric themselves. "Economic
reasoning has been used in a power struggle against other types of reasoning for the determination
of policy rather than used in a cooperative search for a deeper collective synthesis" (Norgaard,
1994, 152). The sustainability debate has fallen prey to the same process. The technocratic
economic approach of decision making is artificially reductionist and noninclusive of dissident
interests. A sustainability policy consisting of maintaining mean income, informed solely by
estimates of sustainable income or of the sustainability of the economy using the CTA, rides
roughshod over all other considerations. As Munasinghe and Shearer (1995, xx) state:
"focusing on developing one index or a set of indicators of sustainability runs the
risk of aggregating together many distinct elements and thereby failing to
understand the human causes and mechanisms of unsustainable management."
Aggregation must be carried out using a certain set of prices. Even if these are "correct"
sustainability prices they will reflect opportunity costs and revealed preferences that result from the
distribution of wealth endowments among individuals and organizations. Many people will in
general reject the normative neoclassical principles of consumer sovereignty and the Hicks-Kaldor
compensation principle as foundations of public policy. As already mentioned above it might not
always even be possible to pay compensation for irreversible environmental changes. However,
the case for rejecting these principles is even stronger in the case of sustainability policy. Even if
we accept the principle of consumer sovereignty, the principle of intemporal equity implied by
sustainability means that we should give equal weight to consumer preferences in all generations.
Both WCED (1987) and Common (1995) argue that concern for future generations is naturally
extended to members of the present generation. Logically, if our basic interest is human welfare
then we should be more concerned with those people who are alive than those who are not yet born
and may never be born. Rawls (1971) only argued for the extension of the maxi-min principle to
members of the present generation, and not to intergenerational distribution issues.
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Mark Sagoff (1988) suggests that a more useful model of human preferences than the neoclassical
approach is a dichotomous distinction between consumer and citizen. He argues that people will
agree to more altruistic proposals when they act in a citizen mode, for example in a referendum,
than when in the consumer mode, for example when making purchasing decisions. He further
argues that it is a "category mistake" to treat decisions about public policy as if they were consumer
decisions. If this were the case then we might make a decision as citizens to leave some things to
the market while deciding to regulate other activities on the basis of other criteria such as safety,
environmental quality etc.
The CTA literature is in many ways the ultimate reductionist economics. Sustainability is an
inherently multidimensional and uncertain subject. The CTA focuses on a single indicator that
embodies particular ethical norms and a particular stance for the valuation of the environment. This
approach generates an opaque indicator of sustainability that  is understood by a select few but not
by the majority of the public. Hazel Henderson asserts that: "Only transparent and tangible
indicators that people can really understand, and visualize and relate to their own lives, will
produce the desired political constituency for needed government policies." (quoted in Proops and
Atkinson, 1993). This question already arises with respect to GDP and GNP indicators. During
the recovery from the recession of the early 1990s in both the United States and the United
Kingdom, governments extolled the rise in GNP while the media and the general public bemoaned
the continuing severe recession. This discrepancy was probably one of the major reasons why
Bush failed to be reelected to the US presidency in 1992. The public clearly does not believe in
GDP as an indicator of welfare. Why, similarly, would the public believe in a green GDP figure as
an indicator of sustainability? On the one hand this is a positive sign that the public has not been
duped by reductionist economics, while on the other hand it is a depressing sign of how the
general public has been excluded from economic debate.
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G. Munda et al. (1994) characterize environmental management and especially management aimed
at securing or increasing sustainability as an exercise in conflict management. They go on to
express the opinion that we need to
"provide more insight into the nature of these conflicts by providing systematic
information and ways to arrive at political compromises in cases of divergent
preferences ... by making trade-offs in a complex situation more transparent to
decision-makers." (Munda et al., 1994, 101).
They suggest that multicriteria analysis (see below) may be one way to achieve this goal. Silvio
Funtowicz and Jerome Ravetz (1994) make a similar plea for multiple criteria of valuation, explicit
value statements and democratic process. Munasinghe and Shearer (1995, xx) suggest that:
"the task of the scientist is to provide information to help people choose among
conflicting objectives and the consequences of their application."
 On the other hand, single, supposedly universal frameworks of analysis facilitate central control
and power and exclude the views of those directly affected or interested third parties who disagree
with the dominant ideology (Norgaard, 1994).
VI. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABILITY
An alternative approach to sustainability must address both methods of analysis and policy making.
There is a definite relationship between these two activities. Neoclassical normative analysis is
particularly suited to a mode of technocratic policy-making that respects the status quo and
demands strong justification of deviations from it. Alternative methods of analysis must provide
information that can be useful in alternative modes of policy making.
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a . Analysis
For all of the reasons discussed above it seems impossible to make precise statements about the
sustainability of any course of economic development. Carl Folke and Tomas Kåberger (1991,
289) suggest that:
“It is not meaningful to measure the absolute sustainability of a society  at any point
in time. The best that is likely to be possible is to articulate general principles to
assess the relative sustainability of the society or the economic activity compared to
earlier states or economic activities.”
while Richard Norgaard (1994) states that: "It is impossible to define sustainable development in
an operational manner in the detail and with the level of control presumed in the logic of
modernity" (22).
Finding ways to deal with sustainability empirically are still important - they are necessary to aid
policies that might guide the economy in a more sustainable direction. This suggests a number of
possible approaches to articulate sustainability concerns.15 In the following I examine three of
many possible options:
1. Disaggregated sustainability indicators
2. Economy-environment simulation models
3. Historical assessment of sustainability performance.
Various sustainability indicators can be developed to determine whether individual activities are
likely to add or detract from the sustainability goal. These indicators cannot be used to determine
whether an economy is sustainable in an absolute sense, though they may help determine whether
we are likely to be moving away from or towards sustainability. There are a number of forms these
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indicators might take. They may be purely biophysical measurements of the quantity or quality of
particular natural resource stocks. For example, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the
atmosphere, the depth of agricultural soil, or the area and fragmentation of the range of an
endangered species. They may also be economic indicators which are likely to take the form of
productivity indices (Cleveland and Stern, 1993). An indicator of the difficulty of producing a
resource commodity monitors the changing ability of a combination of the environment and
technology to support economic activity.16 It also neatly encapsulates the idea of substituting
manufactured capital, labor, and knowledge for natural resources but does not make the far
reaching claims of sustainable income calculations. Production of a particular resource commodity
may not be essential to a sustainable future but an increase in economic value per unit of resources
employed to appropriate natural resources must be beneficial to the economy. Declining
productivity may warn us of an impending threat to sustainability. On the accountability side, a
statement such as: "it is getting more and more costly to produce food" is more transparent than
"this is the sustainable level of income".17
It is important to develop models of the economy that take into account the processes which affect
sustainability. These models could be used to assess the impacts of policies or activities on the
level of income and other variables in the future. As mentioned above these are macro-forecasts for
very long time horizons. Presenting the results as a very inaccurate projection (with forecast error
intervals or a sensitivity analysis) is more transparent than calculating the supposed level of
sustainable income or net capital accumulation. This approach is already present in the case of
global warming and assessments of the impact of global warming. We might be a bit surprised if
climatologists instead only presented us with figures for sustainable levels of greenhouse gas
emissions. Though these are useful they do not help evaluate the magnitude of the future
consequences of our present actions if we choose to increase the radiative forcing of the
atmosphere.
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A similar approach was taken by the Limits of Growth (Meadows et al., 1972), Carrying Capacity
(Gever et al., 1986), and Beyond the Limits (Meadows et al., 1992) studies, though I am not
advocating use of the specific assumptions or modeling techniques found in these studies. Studies
of this type have been limited by empirical knowledge of the interaction of the economy and
environment. Better policy models will depend on the gathering of empirical data and the
development of theory regarding the actual interaction of the macro-economy and the environment.
The great effort being invested in green accounting is useful in so far as it is gathering information
for this type of analysis (Common and Norton, 1994).
Recently environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) models have been used to examine long-run
economy-environment interactions.18 The EKC hypothesis proposes that there is an inverted U-
shape relationship between environmental degradation and income per capita. A number of
researchers (Grossman and Krueger, 1991; Shafik, 1994; Panayotou, 1993; Cropper and
Griffiths, 1994; Selden and Song, 1994) have estimated EKC's using cross-sectional and panel
data for a variety of pollutants and deforestation variables. The apparent inference is that increasing
income per person will eventually reduce environmental degradation caused by each individual.19
There are a number of problems with this idea, the most relevant here being that, in the early stages
of development, growth may damage the environment so severely that the economy does not
succeed in developing to the stage where environmental degradation is supposed to decrease. All
the same, more sophisticated forms of this analysis could be useful in assessing sustainability
options.
An historical approach would assess what effects activities have had in the past on the
sustainability of development up till the present. This can be measured as the impact of particular
changes in the economy on income per capita and other components of welfare in the long run.
This type of analysis is, however, limited by the length of time series available for the particular
economy under consideration. Stern (1995) uses econometric analysis to examine the impact of
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changes in mining income in nineteen developing countries with large mining sectors on GNP per
capita over a twenty five year time horizon. The strength of the results is affected by the relatively
small number of observations and the large number of variables in the model. However, the
indications are not encouraging. The sample mean showed no improvement in long-run GNP per
capita due to liquidating the mineral resource stock. This is despite most of these economies
meeting the Hartwick rule condition. A number of principally oil producing economies did generate
an increase in income that was permanent over this medium term horizon.
b . Policy-Making
In the longer run, sustainability must be addressed by building new institutions. Such institutions
would need to address the following concerns:
1. Improved decision-making processes and procedures.
2. Respecting the rights of future generations.
3. Resilience enhancement and the precautionary principle.
Multicriteria analysis might be used to synthesize the output of alternative modeling techniques for
policy purposes.20 It is not entirely clear that multicriteria analysis represents a major advance
when analysis is carried out on a technocratic basis. This is clearly the case when it is assumed that
the decision maker's preferences are explicit. However, there do seem to be more possibilities than
under cost-benefit analysis to change the given preferences or examine the choices of competing
groups with varying preferences in order to find a compromise.
Norgaard (1994) advocates a complete shift away from technocracy in order to incorporate new
ways of knowing in the development of a sustainability strategy.21 I would advocate a more partial
strategy where technical expertise is available to all parties, and modes of analysis are designed to
be inclusive of alternative values and interests. Perhaps technical expertise might be made available
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in the way that legal aid is made available to less wealthy litigants in many countries? In the
meantime environmental organizations and other NGOs are increasingly employing their own
scientists and policy analysts. Sustainability problems have an inherently technical dimension -
there is no way of getting away from this fact. On the other hand we cannot simply set
sustainability as a goal and then leave technicians to design policies without reference to the public
arena as there may be many alternative sustainable scenarios and many alternative goals that may
need to be sacrificed. Economic models of the type discussed in the previous subsection can be
used to evaluate the impacts of changes of this sort in terms of whatever variables are deemed of
interest. This approach would be a massive improvement on the present where normative
neoclassical economics is setting the policy agenda let alone merely designing policies to implement
given goals as was envisioned by Auguste Comte (Norgaard, 1994).
Essentially, any sustainability policy must respect the rights of future generations. "Valuation [(that
is pricing at opportunity cost) when there is too little caring for the future (ie. too little asset
transfer) will not lead to sustainability" (Howarth and Norgaard, 1992, 476). Many authors argue
that adoption of zero discount rates are essential to ensure the respect of future generations.
Howarth and Norgaard (1992, 1993) show that, in theory, adoption of an appropriate rights
structure will result in "the" fair intergenerational discount rate. This is much easier said than done!
One approach might be to set up an organization as the representative or guardian of future
generations that would act in a similar way to Central Banks in their zealous fights against
inflation. This organization would enter the political process to counterbalance the effects of the
representatives of the current generation. Otherwise, sustainability will depend solely on the
altruistic notions of the individuals taking part in the debate. This is analogous to Sagoff's (1988)
view that people will agree to more environmental protection as citizens than as consumers. Solow
(1974) raises the possibility of a "social contract" that "binds the next Congress, and the next"
(Solow, 1974, 36), while in his 1986 paper he writes "The image that comes to mind is Ulysses
lashing himself to the mast because he knows he will be tempted by the Sirens." (Solow, 1986,
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148). In an intermediate stage various other institutions could play a related role as discussed in the
rest of this section.
When sustainable development is seen as a very uncertain trajectory into a future laden with
unknown and unexpected shocks, a principle means to increase sustainability is to enhance the
economy's resilience to such shocks. A first step in resilience enhancement is the adoption of the
precautionary principle with regard to actions that may "threaten" sustainability (Common, 1995).
We would aim to limit or curtail such activities. Not that we know for certain that they will lower
the level of welfare in the future, but we might have good reason to suppose so and there may
often be other benefits to adopting the policy. For example, the accumulation of greenhouse gases
in the atmosphere appears to threaten sustainability. A policy to reduce greenhouse gases by
shifting taxes from labor to fossil fuels might also increase employment and thereby address
distributional interests - the so called double dividend (Fitzroy, 1993).
A second step is to adopt resource use policies that limit the impact that unplanned environmental
variation is likely to have on the economy. Following Buzz Holling (1986), Perrings (1994b)
argues that as both ecosystems and economies accumulate biomass or capital they can become
increasingly fragile and prone to the effects of external shocks.  Also, as the economy increasingly
dominates its environment, it has less capacity to use the environment to buffer such shocks. In
other words the system becomes less resilient. Perrings and Pearce (1993) argue that a laissez faire
economy existing in an environment subject to threshold effects will tend to operate close to such
thresholds thus making itself more susceptible to shocks. A classic case is pastoral agricultural
systems in Sub-Saharan Africa subject to cyclical variations in rainfall. During rainy periods
livestock numbers tend to increase towards the current carrying capacity of the system. The
decrease in carrying capacity during dry periods causes overgrazing, die-offs of livestock, and
possibly permanent degradation of the rangeland (Perrings and Stern, 1995). An organization that
monitored the state of the rangeland, the weather, and the economy could act to adaptively regulate
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the quantity of livestock so as to reduce the occurrence of permanent degradation events. This
might be accomplished through adjusting offtake prices (Perrings, 1994a). It is important to note
that in the general context there is no explicit optimal policy in the neoclassical sense (Clark, 1990).
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The CTA has become established as the dominant theoretical basis for economic sustainability
policy. Despite this, the two main schools of thought within this approach suggest different policy
objectives. Those that emphasize substitutability between natural capital and artificial capital
suggest that policy makers attempt to maintain an aggregate stock of capitals. Those that emphasize
complementarity between the two classes of capital propose that policy makers focus on
maintaining specific aggregates of capital or capital stocks.
Nevertheless, both these approaches depend on particular conceptions of economy-environment
interactions and of the working of the economy and environment individually. Only under certain
technical conditions is it possible to consistently aggregate a stock of natural capital. Only under
certain conditions regarding substitution possibilities in production and consumption is
maintenance of an aggregate capital stock sufficient to maintain welfare in the face of declining
natural resource stocks. In either case, the true sustainability prices that should be used in this
aggregation are unknown and unknowable. Further, only for an economy actually moving along a
sustainable development path are the maximum sustainable consumption and environmentally
adjusted national income measured at market prices. From a normative perspective, focussing
policy on single indicators of aggregate welfare obscures the underlying modeling assumptions,
embodies the normative values of the status quo, and frustrates informed public debate on
sustainability policy.
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I suggest a number of directions for both theoretical and empirical research that could inform the
debate over sustainability. Some of these approaches are also model dependent. However, the
output of these techniques is much more disaggregated information on the sustainability prospects
of society, and the assumptions behind the techniques are always outlined. Techniques that involve
forecasts can be subjected to sensitivity analysis or the construction of confidence intervals. More
disaggregated and transparent information is more suitable for inclusion in a democratic debate on
society's future options. Such an approach not only will provide better information for decision
making, but also help to make explicit the distributional and technological assumptions underlying
the idea of sustainability.
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Notes
1
 See Pearce (1994) for references. Most later changed their mind, and joined the proliferators.
Beckerman (1992, 1994) is one who still dismisses sustainability.
2
 For example, the topic of the International Society for Ecological Economics conference in
Stockholm in 1992 was "Investing in Natural Capital: A Prerequisite for Sustainability" (Jansson et
al., 1994).
3
 Pearce et al. (1989) also use the definition: "natural capital assets ... should not decline through
time" (37).
4
 Solow (1986) allows for more than two substitutable capitals.
5
 One exception is the World Bank study: Monitoring Economic Progress  (IBRD, 1995).
6
 This misunderstanding is still occurring as evidenced by Wilfred Beckerman's (1994) paper, in
which he asserts that strong sustainability has been superseded by weak sustainability as the goal
of environmentalists.
7
 Weak sustainability is sometimes called Solow sustainability (Common and Perrings, 1992;
Turner et al., 1992). Demarcation between these categories varies among authors with Turner et al.
(1992) differentiating among four different views on the necessary conditions for sustainability.
8
 It is not entirely clear how strongly Costanza and Daly (1992) question the possibility of some
substitutability between resources and manufactured capital. For example they state: "There are
clear economic limits to growth, but not development" (43) and go on to define development as
growth that does not require an increase in resource throughput. Daly (1992) specifically argues
that "No one denies the reality of technical progress, but to call such changes the substitution of
capital for resources is a serious confusion". However, the standard weak sustainability capital
theory approach appears to assume that the capital stock is adjusted for technological improvements
(Weitzman, 1976; Pezzey, 1994).
9
 Extraction of energy vectors such as coal or oil is not production of energy.
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10
 Once an innovation is made the value of the innovation may be added to the value of the firm's
"capital". But as long as the R and D process does not produce results it will act as a drain on
capital.
11
 Richard Norgaard (1991) makes a point related to the Cambridge-Cambridge "capital
controversy". Faucheux and O'Connor (1995) note that Hicks' (1946) definition of income
referred to a price-taking firm and that conclusions one may draw at this micro level do not
necessarily apply at the macro level.
12
 However, in an economy with technical progress, efficient paths can be sustainable at positive
discount rates.
13
 For example if farmers or developers were taxed in aesthetically attractive regions for their use
of environmental quality this might promote development in less attractive but perhaps more crucial
areas in terms of life support eg. wetlands.
14
 If people are stewards of nature for God, as in the Jewish, Christian, and Islamic tradition, then
there are limits placed on human action. Animals etc. do not have intrinsic rights but they are to be
respected as elements in the Divine creation.
15
 Again Norgaard (1994) argues that: "Even though I dismiss the possibility of defining
sustainable development operationally, a more sophisticated exploration of the difficulties of
organizing sustainable development is in order" (20).
16
 Resource commodities are "produced" goods extracted from the natural environment. Resource
stocks are natural resources located in situ that may serve to produce resource commodities or may
provide resource services.
17
 See Peter Victor (1991) for a more extensive discussion of alternative sustainability indicators.
18
 See David Stern et al. (1994) for a survey of the literature and a critical examination.
19
 This inference is clearly made by Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger (1991), Nemat Shafik
(1994), and in the World Bank Development Report 1992 (IBRD, 1992).
20
 See the survey by Munda et al. (1994) for more details
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21
 In other places Norgaard seems to advocate the type of policy-making environment I describe in
the following.
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